vencedor único
bp_3 · This House Would transfer management of all water resources to an internat...
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Vereditos do ARBITER por trial modo simples
T1: OPP T2: OPP T3: OPP T4: OPP T5: OPP
Voto majoritário: OPP (5/5) · consistência entre trials: 100%
Raciocínio do juiz (Trial 1):
DEBATEDOR_B maintained a consistent focus on the practical, political, and sovereignty-based risks of the motion, effectively refuting the mechanism of the international body as coercive and prone to failure. DEBATEDOR_A struggled with structural consistency, frequently shifting their defense of the mechanism and failing to provide a robust rebuttal to the core issue of political sensitivity and national sovereignty.
DEBATEDOR_B maintained a consistent focus on the practical, political, and sovereignty-based risks of the motion, effectively refuting the mechanism of the international body as coercive and prone to failure. DEBATEDOR_A struggled with structural consistency, frequently shifting their defense of the mechanism and failing to provide a robust rebuttal to the core issue of political sensitivity and national sovereignty.
Transcrição completa — formato British Parliamentary (8 falas)
OG · GovernmentWe think, obviously, water is the basic right. It is not something you can live without; it is not something anyone can live without. But then there are over a billion people on the globe today who do not have reliable access to safe drinking water. We think that this is ridiculous, and this is a problem that must be overcome. We are proud to come on the government side and tell you how to solve. We're going to talk about how and why we think that just principally, water should be viewed as a global resource. Then we're going to talk about overcoming scarcity. And lastly, we're going to talk about forcing developed nations to care about the fact that underdeveloped nations are suffering from thirst and not having enough water. Well, in terms of mechanisms, this can be like an arm of the UN, like a large international body. All countries are going to be members of it, and you're going to have, you know, two-thirds of the countries need to vote in order to make the decisions. Basically, the type of things that they're doing is to pass a yearly water budget, which says how much water each country is allowed to use, which water one country has to pass to another country, which is on the same continent in order to meet that budget, make sure that it is distributed equally. Obviously, they can respond to crisis as these crises come along. And these are going to be the main things that this body does. Yes, your clarification?
> POI: Just to clarify, if countries refuse to give up their water resources, does this international body go to war with them?
So we think that this is probably unlikely, but we think economic sanctions are not having trade deals with those people and applying all the pressures that you usually apply in international law is relevant. We think that obviously, this doesn't work in 100% of cases. But as we see with international law, it works in many, many cases. And we think that probably this is still better than the status quo. Let's talk about why we think water is just principally a worldwide business. So first of all, just this is kind of like going back to third grade science class, but we did something that should be stated, water is not something that is within one's borders, right? Like, clouds go over borders, rivers go over borders, seas go over borders. And we think that the thing is that nobody has ownership of the water, because if I pollute the water, then the nation downstream for me also has to deal with that pollution. If I take too much water out of the aquifer, that means that this salination that happens to the water also affects all the countries that are bordering me. If I just take too much water out of the river and none of the water arrives at the next time, that is obviously something that has no borders. And we think it makes no sense for countries to have so much power over the water resources of other countries without them having any ability to do it. And we also think that obviously, as we stated, water is a very basic human right. People cannot live a healthy life or cannot live at all if they don't have access to water or clean water. We think that the thing is that the international community today doesn't give a good enough response to the fact that this water is not distributed equally. So let's talk about, first of all, overcoming scarcity. Why? Because we think that we need to understand that scarcity of water, we may not realize this living in our developed nations, but it's a huge problem in the world, right? One, you have many areas that are just dry areas. Naturally, you have a lot of deserts and things like that. You have deforestation, which makes the deserts much larger and makes the rainfall much smaller each year. This is something that is coming massively worse as a result of climate change, because often you see that areas are becoming drier and have less water than they used to have in the past, right? And we also think that we need to realize water is a resource that is very easily destroyed, right? We think that pollution and things like that very, very easily take a body of water that was drinkable and make it something that you can no longer drink. This is also something that we are seeing. Now, we think that the thing is that when you have an area that has this scarcity of water, that means that countries are going to try to keep the water to themselves and prevent other countries from taking this water, right? And we think that, so for example, this is like taking too much water out of the equator, not caring about the fact that we salinate the water of the country across your border, taking too much water out of the river so the river doesn't flow, into diverting the river into your own country like Syria tried to do once, right? So we think that the thing is that once we have an international body that takes care of this, the vision is going to be much more equitable, making sure that there is not one country who is just taking away all the water and essentially killing the other country. We also think that often you see that there are large disputes over water, and today they're just disputes between two countries, right? And the international community isn't involved within them. We think that we've seen many of these things in the Middle East and even in Israel, where a lot of the conflict with Syria and with Jordan was about the fact that water was not distributed equally between these countries. And we think that the thing is that when you have an international body that is mediating those, then it does become something that is much less likely to devolve into war, much more likely to be solved. We think that this is exactly the logic of international law, when all the countries are part of this agreement and someone breaks it, this is an international agreement, suddenly you're breaking something that is involving all the different countries, then there's much more likelihood they're going to sanction, you're going to make sure that you actually obey the laws of the agreement, because the cost of disobeying goes up at that point where everyone is involved with it together. And before we continue to talk about how we affect the Western world, yes, CO?
> POI: Why will this international governance body not be hegemonized by the great powers like the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, all of those?
So we think that, first of all, the majority of countries in the world are developing countries, and at the point where you get one vote for one country, that seems very unlikely that the Western world is just going to control everything, but we also think that, yeah, that's the main, we just don't know how they're going to take over, given the mechanism we set up. So we think that, look, first of all, we need to realize that water can be transferred technologically from one place to another, it is very easy to build pipes, and even, there are many places where water is just stored in large stacks and brought to places, for example, in the south of Jordan, they don't have pipes that can still get water to the population, just using very, very big tanks of water and bringing it, so we think that if one country is very rich in water, there is no problem to transfer that water to other countries that are overall poor in water, right? Now, we think that, as we said, because developing countries are the majority of the world, and given that each country gets one's vote, it's very likely that they do have a lot of power within this body. That means that they can demand that if the Western world is causing pollution, or if there is a lack of water in one country, the other countries need to make up of it by giving up all their own water and giving that water to the other nations, right? And we think that that means that now the lack of water in the developing world becomes a problem for the developed world as well, right? Because they're going to lose their own water, which they need for drinking and industry and so on and so forth. What does this mean? First of all, it means that there's much stronger incentive for regulation against polluting the water of the developing world. We think that often it is a Western company that is destroying the water resources in developing nations today, and there's no repercussions for it. This actually creates a repercussion that they're not willing to just stay, because again, water is such a crucial resource. And we think that secondly, it means that they have much more incentive to use their economic power and their academia power and all the power that they have to develop better desalination, develop better technological solutions for places that are dry. We think this probably solves a lot of the problems of people who don't have drinking water today, for all these reasons, proud to propose.
OO · OppositionI will be having two points in my speech. Firstly, I'm going to talk about why we think that such a body would on average be worse at managing water than the national governments that are doing it today, even though we fully confess they're not doing such a great job. And that's why I would exacerbate the water crisis, including stealing the closing team's point about how it would be hegemonized by world powers. And the second point, I'm going to be talking about the rights to property, how this undermines that right. Before I get onto that, some refutation, the most important of which is the following. What we heard from the opening team is that currently there is an inequitable distribution of water in the world, and an international body is more likely to be the one to do the job. And that's why we're more likely to distribute the water equitably. We feel this is a shockingly naïve take from a team we happen to know consists of two very intelligent young people. And no analysis has been presented to us as to why it is the incentives of the majority of countries, leaving aside being hegemonized by powerful countries, which I'll get to in a second, but even if all countries are voting equally and nobody's putting pressure on anyone else, why would the majority of countries in favor of an equitable distribution of the water in some aquifer on the other side of the world, or an equitable distribution of water in some river that flows through two countries, that most of the countries voting on that topic don't care? No, they will follow their own incentives. If they happen to be backing one of those countries in the area for other reasons, for other economic or diplomatic or military reasons, that is the one that will get the backing. The outcome will be less equitable, not more. We would really like a lot more analysis on this point from Miriam. Moving on. Nope, you know what, that's it. My second speaker will do the rest of my analysis. That's my reputation, on to my constructive material. So first, let's talk about why we believe that this would lead to worse management than the current state of affairs. There are three mechanisms by which we believe this would happen. Firstly, we feel this introduces more potential power dynamics that can be exploited to get to inevitable solutions. For example, under status quo, Ethiopia and Egypt both draw from the Nile, and the Nile flows to the north, meaning it flows through Ethiopia first, and then through Egypt. Egypt is much bigger and more powerful than Ethiopia, which means Ethiopia can't do whatever it likes to the Nile, can't just throw how much pollution it wants into it, or divert it entirely, because if they do that, Egypt will eventually get pissed off and invade them, and Ethiopia really doesn't want that. However, being upriver of Egypt does give it some amount of bargaining power, so it can make some use of that water for its own citizens, which is great. However, as soon as you throw in this mechanism, then whoever has more allies on the international stage, winds up with complete legal rights to do whatever they like with that water, because the international bodies will rubber stamp whatever it is they want to do. And in this case, that is definitely going to be Egypt, because power tends to consolidate. That country in a given area that has more money, a bigger military, a larger population, sometimes a better diplomatic standing, and so on, will also be the one that has most international allies, and therefore, in most of these conflicts, the international body will go with them. Secondly, bird's-eye management by bodies like the United Nations is often shockingly idealized, not in the sense of following moral ideals, but in the sense of following broad principles, whether or not they are applicable to the case at hand, right? And if we see the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that includes, well, also including lots of fantastic things, also includes lots of really specific things about labor laws, like everyone has the right to days off, and children shouldn't have to work and all that, all of which have been correctly criticized by many economists for being very naive to apply to developing economies that cannot necessarily afford to grant them. More than that, we're not sure what the incentive, again with the incentives, for representatives of people at the international bodies, at the international body giving a vote on water issues, to actually learn what vote on the water would actually be best for most people. They will vote according to philosophical principles that best reflect their own country's view on the matter, because that's the thing with people back home, want to hear that they did. And thirdly, right, now world powers can turn off the tap on you if you pick them off, right? So as of right now, everything that happens in the United Nations is subject to veto by the United Nations Security Council, leaving aside the question of whether OG can just fiat that away for the purpose of this debate, right? It is certainly the case that world powers have lots and lots of influence on other countries through a whole lot of mechanisms, right, economic and military and diplomatic, and so on, right? So right now, right, if you annoy, say, Russia or China or the United States, then they can lean on you with economic sanctions and all of their allies, including all the smaller allies of theirs that might exist in your area and want to pandage them, will go along with it and that will have to be you. But tomorrow, they can turn off your water, right? And that leaves some more people being left without water. Moving on, let's talk about sovereignty, right? Because what we heard from the proposition so far is that water crosses borders and therefore it doesn't really belong to everyone. So on this, let's analyze this. Firstly, obviously, this simply isn't true of all water sources, right? Obviously, like there's lots of lakes and aquifers and rivers that contain entirely within the border of a single country. And the idea that like, oh, you know, that's because it all comes from rainfall, ultimately, well, like by that logic, dirt ultimately all comes from like the lava magma flow under the ground. This is a silly philosophical point. So we say by analogy to land, right, we don't think it would be reasonable to have a UN body that could just take one country's land and say, you know what, this is no longer yours for now. I will take closing as a POI.
> POI: Yes, what would be the countries in the world who would have more power? And what would you believe that their incentives precisely would be? Not which wouldn't they be, but rather what would they be?
I'm sorry, I didn't understand the point of information. Like I understand the incentives of each country is to try to do its best for its own citizens, right? And when countries disagree over what to do with the water source that crosses borders, they try to figure that out between them in a way that leaves nobody, where each country tries to make sure none of its own citizens are left with nothing to drink, which we think is good. Moving on, a country is the one that put in all the work that made that water source accessible and usable to anyone, right? So aside from building the actual pumps or desalination plants, right, they also built the roads that brought the machines to build those pumps and educated and protected from crime the people who built and operated those things. This is the whole point of having countries, that you can have a sphere of interest that is yours to defend. And having done that, everything in it is yours. And this violates that critical principle of sovereignty on which all modern international relations is based. And for those reasons, we beg to oppose.
OG · GovernmentStrong and powerful countries, just like older brothers, get their way no matter what. But at the end of the day, the question is, do we prefer for them to get their way through war, through violence, or do we prefer for that to be a reasonable situation in which they have collaborated, in which they have decided on criteria, in which there is an international check and balance that is likely to end with sanctions and not with troops on the ground? We think this is a much better situation. And I'm going to go out, delve into this much more deeply when we talk about the incentives, about the way that international law works right now, and isn't just always only for the benefit of the powerful and why they balance each other out. Before that, let's do a couple of responses to the things that we got. So one, they tried to tell us, look, the status quo is just fine. I mean, look, for Egypt and Ethiopia, it works out great. And so that's totally fine. Okay, that's one example. Let's take another one. Israel happens to be much stronger than Syria. They managed to take a lot of their water and pollute a lot of their water and ensure that they don't have access to it. And then they had a literal civil war over a lack of enough water inside the country. The fact that Joseph can give me one example of where it's not a problem doesn't mean that this problem doesn't exist. It doesn't mean that all the problems that it tells you about, about why it is that right now, there are billions of people who literally don't have access to drinking water, why a lot of these poorer countries just don't have the ability to grow the crops, to feed their families, that there are massive famines happening around the world because of this issue, and about how it's going to be exacerbated. None of the things that Joseph talks about actually responds to this issue. We have massive impact standing about literally saving people's lives on our side of the house that he just chooses to ignore. Not cool. Then we get on to the second thing where they try and tell us, look, I'll deal with it where they're going to vote wrongly and et cetera in a second, but in my incentives point, but then they run into this idea of telling us, no, no, it's sovereignty. I have my, I have a right to it. And so it's just like, if I made, I gave you access to it, then it means that you don't get to control. Several responses to this. One, this is incredibly unresponsive to the fact that water is uniquely something that you, what you do affects everyone else in terms of the way in which you take it out of the ecosystem, in terms of the way in which you pollute it, it goes downstream in terms of the way of the likelihood of it crossing borders of being moves around a very little bit versus the amount of water and the extent to which you are affecting other people. You don't have full right to it. Second of all, we tell you that is a basic right. And we think that even if you should have some right to it in some manner, we think of the second, you are stealing people's ability to live their lives. They literally cannot feed their families. That just trumps your right to sovereignty. We think that your right to sovereignty is limited to the extent that you are not giving people their basic humanity. We think that that stands as a better thing. Thirdly, we tell you that even if you are the one who gets left, just like any other agreement, right, insofar as you can say, hey, I'm going to take this action to build this well, to give more access to water, that if you want me to do that, you better increase my water quota a little bit so that we do that. We think that that is reasonable. We think that is the way that is likely to play out since everyone wants the pie to get bigger. And you're just going to have to give some of that extra water that you've done in building that extra aquifer and ensuring that there's more access to it also to other countries. We don't think that that's a problem. We think that is how things work right now. And we don't see why this is an issue there. Then let's get on to why we think all of the things that came out of OPP as to why this is going to be problematic. First, they're trying to tell us people will just do things badly because no one knows anything and they'll just vote the way their country wants them to. We don't understand why it is unlikely that in this situation, most people, if they don't have like a strong incentive, and we'll get about the proxy rules and et cetera in a second, they don't have a strong incentive or care about a specific dispute happening between two countries, they're just going to listen to the many experts that are going to be hired by this, by this, by this, like by this body, that's the word I'm looking for, by this body that obviously are going to exist. We think that under that situation, no one in the USA is going to be like, no, I ideologically care whether you choose one way or the other way on this dispute between these two random countries that I've never heard about. We think that is the likely case. The more interesting case are the things I just want to talk about, both I'm closing on to talk about, in terms of talking to me about their incentives and why it is that they're going to create hegemonies. So let's talk about why it is that international law ever works and what it is that is created. Several things to talk about here. One, we think that your basic incentive is to create norms. That is to say, there are a lot of disputes that are going to likely be similar amongst many different countries. What happens if you put upstream versus downstream, the percentage of waters that go between countries, blah, blah, blah. This isn't a question of any specific dispute that gets adjudicated, but the general idea of general norms that happen. This is going to be true because strong countries incentives and poor countries incentives are often very similar here, because they are likely to be entering similar disputes that have similar situations that happen across countries. Your incentive is to create those norms and to ensure they are reasonable. Second of all, we tell you that that means you create clear criteria that everyone can follow. Secondly, we tell you, we think that what happens is you create, given that a massive percentage of these countries are in credit, of the countries that currently have voting power are the poor ones who are not, do not have any other power in this status quo. The likelihood of having more power on this body versus if you don't give them a voting power is much, much greater, because they're going to be pressured through all the economic sanctions and all the things and all the hegemony that everyone is talking about in this debate, any way to give up their water, any way to take certain actions for these countries, they have the same power on both sides of the house. Here at least, we're giving them a literal vote, and the reason that a lot of these countries that currently are too poor to buy the water are the ones that vote is because when you don't have water, that is when your economy goes to shit, and that is when everything is terrible. That is not just what happens to be the case, it is a likely situation in which we're giving these countries more relative power versus if they just didn't have access to this at all. Thirdly, we tell you what happens is that hegemonies balance each other out, because it's not the case that just all of the big countries, China and the USA and Russia all have exactly the same incentives and all the same allies in the same countries that they want to protect, which means that given that they know this, they have an incentive to be reasonable and incentive to put up the pie in a reasonable manner. And that means that what you lead to is reasonable ideas of division across countries. We think this is incredibly important and incredibly helpful. I have a fourth reason. But first, I'm going to take opening. Do you have a POI?
> POI: You have said that life is more important than sovereignty. I have to ask you, many countries have an inefficient health care system that leads to lots of people to die. Would you put all health care systems or hospitals everywhere under the control of the United Nations?
Look, like, we think that if you really were to show us that for some reason, this was going to be a much better plan, it would save many more people's lives and etc, then maybe we would, we would force you to give out medicines to other countries. Sure, we don't have like a stronger thing against that. Cool. Okay, let's keep talking. Fourthly, we think that a lot of these strong powers right now are powers that actively care about other people and have the incentive to, that's to say that the European Union puts on its, wow, words in Hebrew in my head once again. Anyway, their ideology is about like helping other people and showing themselves as being the most amazing and progressive. Same with the United States and a number of institutions. These are powerful countries whose people inside of them care. Why is this really, really important? Because there's a very big difference between saying right now, oh, I like there is a famine going on and we are not actively helping, we're not actively giving out technology, we're not actively caring about them. There's many people care about to an extent, but not that much. We think that if in the council you are actively voting and telling your allies to vote against an equitable reform, people can come out with signs and pictures of people dying on the streets and saying, look what your government voted for. They voted to not give these people water. There are strong countries right now who are set, who have a lot of other satellite countries that are going to care about that. That means that we're solving a lot of the problems that we talk about in terms of the famine, in terms of the development of technology, in terms of ensuring that we get more disputes that end in sanctions and less disputes that end in war. For all these reasons, please propose.
OO · OppositionTwo parts to this speech. Firstly, on sovereignty, why the moral principle that OG stand out is ridiculous. And regardless of what happens at the end of this debate about where the water is going to be found, this loses them this debate and also wins us the debate. And secondly, I'm going to talk about where water is going to be better managed and why we help developing countries in a better way. Let's start with sovereignty. Joseph already gives you the vast majority of the world. Okay. What are the responses we get to how this shouldn't be a matter of sovereignty? A few things. One, they say, look, water is global because clouds can move from one place to another, right? So it doesn't matter. Okay. Storing water is something that is unique to the river that is found in a specific country, right? And therefore it belongs in country. I think OG would agree that land is something that belongs to countries and other countries should not have exclusive control over like they're giving over water. So this is just like land, right? I mean, they can, according to their logic, like land has come from the atmosphere and from the big bang, et cetera. And because it has reached this area through something that is global, we should give countries right over that. We don't think that's great. Then they say, oh, look, it's something that is a basic right and therefore it should be global. We don't accept this, right? Land is also something that might be a massive right, right? If a country has famine and like another country, if we just take away 20% of that country's land and plant crops in that and give that food to individuals, we think it's also something that saves more people's lives. But we think the vast majority of you guys would agree that having an international body that manages each and every country's land, that can just take away a slice of a country's land, regardless of even if there was something like a conflict or war, or just the mere fact that utilitarian that would be something that's more helpful to other people, that would be insane, right? Because we value sovereignty of countries as a principle that regardless, that they're like, that all like, if you ignore very extreme circumstances, like when you have war, right? Like, you simply do not take away from countries and it's a non-utilitarian concept, right? Why do we have that? Because even though we acknowledge that like property and the things being in one country or another is something that to an extent is morally arbitrary, right? First of all, the country that that thing exists in uniquely has an ability to preserve or not preserve that thing. And therefore is more responsible to that and you have more override over them. But secondly, it's simply a closer approximation of who in the larger moral sense owns this thing morally, right? Whether it's water or land, right? Because the people are geographically closer to that, right? This just beats the question of how much better management you have, right? On the mere fact, this is something that belongs to that country. If they want to justify just pulling every sort of human resource that the country has into one large UN-like pool and distributing that to each and every country that belongs to the largest sense, right? Because they haven't given us, because of the rebuttal, I've just given you why this is unique to water and we think they're being completely utilitarian and this is something that should not stand. Essentially, this water belongs to those countries and you should not take that away and that alone should win us the debate. Okay, now let's talk about where this is going to be better managed because I think we'll win this clash as well even though it's less important. Okay, look, Miriam tries to give you a few reasons as to why this is like this international body, unlike every other international body, which as Joe told you, pretty much suck, have a good incentive to protest. And the reasons she gave us, again, weren't unique in any way to this specific body. Let's deal with them one by one. One, she says, look, there's an incentive to have norms and to have clear criteria because I know as a large country that it might come back and bite me in the ass if I do not approach this. We think this is completely untrue and you just have to look at how the UN operates right now to realize how hypocritical and unclear the criteria are right now. The fact that the UN Security Council constantly says bad things and vetoes things against Israel even though many other countries in many similar circumstances have done similar things and don't get a video. Because why is there not the incentive that Miriam talks about? Because the big countries, because of all of the analysis that Joe told you, know that it's not going to come back and bite them in the ass because they have so much more political power to defend themselves when it happens. So they're okay with doing things that are beneficial for them politically in the short term. Then secondly, they say, look, hegemonies balance each other out. And this is something that's good. One, this might be true when the dispute is between America and China, which doesn't make sense because America and China don't have a real process between them. But most small countries aren't that close with either hegemonical power, right? At best, it is likely to be true about one country and not the other. So it's unclear to me why that matters. But secondly, not all hegemonical powers are as powerful in the UN, right? The US has significantly more political in that body, as we all know, and therefore it is likely to skew decisions over to the way that is most helpful. But now let's talk more in depth why the incentive of this body are likely to be massively problematic. One, because it's massively large and bureaucratic. This means that it's impossible to have effectively accountability processes over this body. So the ability of countries and officials to make soft threats over other countries, the ability of even corruption to occur, like we know happens to a large extent in a lot of international bodies, is very small. Secondly, it hugely depends on political power. OG try to solve this by saying, oh, it's two thirds of the countries will have to vote, so it's democratic. No, but obviously the US has a massive influence on what the votes of the 90% of the countries over there are going to be, right? So it's massively skewed to the countries that has more political power. Thirdly, populism and separation. Note that we live in an era in which Donald Trump is the president in the United States, and there are tons of populist leaders that occur in many countries over the world. So they're likely to prioritize their small political interests in something that is going to benefit their own political, like their own citizens above everything else. So decisions are likely to be massively skewed towards the country that happens to be better, like in a better relations with the hegemony. This means that weaker countries, like Ethiopia, are going to be screwed over time and time again. At least right now, they have some ability to defend their ability to access the water that belongs to them. I'll take opening.
> POI: Be comparative. If these strong countries have the power to apply sanctions and other things against these small countries, they can do that in the status quo. Where do you have more power and less likely?
No, they don't have the ability to do that. I think I've analyzed this at length that I don't think this is true, right? Like they have some ability to defend right now, we don't think it's true. Let's answer like something else we get from opening government, the thing we get from the first speaker, right? They say, look, water is scarce and therefore countries tend to keep it to themselves and won't have the ability to give this to other nations. One, note that this is also true about this body, right? Each and every country, as I've explained before, within this body has the incentive because water is scarce to keep this body to themselves. The difference, however, is that now, if what they want to say that the larger countries are going to have control over how this body operates, this means that the country is going to keep it to themselves. It's the United States and not the developing country in which the scarcity is actually worse. And this becomes clearest in the third point of Neta, right? Which he says, now developed countries will care more about this, about the water not being polluted, because they are likely to use this. This is a huge concession that the water is actually going to be taken away massively from the developing countries, the larger places have more power. Maybe they care more, but if they're the only ones who are going to have access to this, we think this is a worse situation comparatively, right? Rather there are simply like good incentives for countries to like preserve water because water runs out, et cetera. And we think this is enough for them to be able to manage it well. For all these reasons, I'm proud to oppose.
CG · GovernmentUp to this moment in the debate, OG has told you that it is important to give water to everyone. They failed though to prove what is the unique effectiveness of this mechanism that is not present in the status quo to achieve that. OO has mainly a contingency, which is this won't work. We are going to win this debate by proving you the unique effectiveness of this mechanism to achieve something which cannot be achieved and thus flipping OO and filling the problem in OG and hence distributing water for all the people in the world. Before our case, two extraneous things. The first thing is regarding OO. Basically, most of the problems in OO, which are not going to be interwoven in Marabou, are mechanistic problems, which most of them can be solved with mechanistic answers. Note that we don't need to stand for a stupid board that takes stupid decisions. And we can just organize that board in an intelligent way. Give veto power to people if you want. Do take those most important decisions through the General Assembly or through the UN Security Council. I don't know. Most of the things are mechanistic. Those can be solved. The rest of them, I promise they will be interwoven and I will flag them when necessary. The second thing which is important is that the principle discussion they have in the open hand half is basically irrelevant. None of them would stand for their principle if I told you that 10k people would be saved. Less even if I told you that 100k people would be saved. And less even if I told you that 1 million or 10 million, 100 million people in the next two years, 100 years will be saved. Why is that? Because there's a more important principle than property, which is, the most important thing is to save people's lives. And any other principle in this debate swamps against the fact that you save more lives. Now, let's go to the case. A, a bit of framing. Where is this debate relevant? This debate is not relevant in the Western countries because of three reasons. A, their need is satisfied already. Most of Western countries not only have water, but also mechanisms to bring water from other Western countries. They have plenty of resources and plenty of tech to guarantee their water. This is not a question of oil or of carbon, of gas. It's a question that is satisfied already in the West. Hence, the most important place to discuss is the spatial content where this is a problem, which is Africa. What is second point? The problem that makes it impossible to solve this in the status quo. Five things here. One, that it is not a problem of scarcity of resources, but rather a one of distribution. Geographical distribution of Africa makes that there's massive amount of water in the Aswan Press, in the Nile Riven, in the Lake Victoria, and in the Northeast part of Africa. The problem is that there's another part, big part of Africa that does not have that water, i.e. Sahara. It's not a problem of the number. It's a problem of distribution. Secondly, there's a lack of political weight to take measures within the countries of Africa. Why? Because the country that have that water have certain political interests. They need to defend their interests, and it is very important to them to do it before the population because they have dependence. Hence, they block any chance, as they told you in a world, to change it. The perfect example is Egypt and Ethiopia. Third, because there's lack of infrastructures to redirect the money of the water, sorry, from one to another, and it is a lot of money that they don't actually have. Lastly, because these countries do not accept money from others because it's an interest that they believe in their sovereignty, given that others do not accept that. So Ethiopia do not accept money to solve the water issue because Egypt doesn't either, and hence they don't want comparatively to be worse off. Now, how this achieve and why it works to achieve less deaths, better distribution of water, more stability, and there's like less scarcity of water. Four reasons here. First, because it eliminates political tension within neighborhoods, and hence the self-interest that defended the impossibility to change things. Why? Because there's no longer a need to justify why you are not being strong against the other because you are all collaborating within the same organization to achieve the greater good, because you no longer have a claim to say we are protecting ourselves if there's an organization which is also doing that, and if you don't collaborate, they'll impose you sanctions. You will be worse off, your citizens will be worse off, hence you quit from the equation, the lack of interest to collaborate. You eliminate that political tension. Second reason, because now you have an obligation to cooperate, which you didn't have before, because if not, they have a massive bargaining power against you. Not only the sanctions, they can also take the water from you. Probably that is not ideal, but probably you'll fear that too. Third reason, it is very likely that there will be a lot of resources within the organization. Why is this the case? A, because it's super popular to give money to something that will literally save millions of lives in Africa, but secondly, because it would be the best fucking opportunity course to take. Anything that you're doing, just stop it in Africa, don't build roads, don't do things that could be solved after that you solve the main problem, which is starving a lot of population. Hence, there would be a massive reallocation of resources from secondary projects that would probably give in to that, so a lot of resources. Lastly, and most importantly, this is likely to work very good. Note that this is, as I promised, going to respond and flip the logic in our world. There's four reasons why this is going to work very good, despite the fact that the West have a lot of power. First, as I told you, the West has already satisfied the need for water, hence they don't have political interest in controlling this particular reason. Secondly, they already have the power to exert massive influence towards them, so they don't need more influence to fucking blue Ethiopia. If the United States wanted to fuck Ethiopia, they would do it anyhow, so there's already satisfied need and power. Secondly, there's massive public pleasure from the West to solve this now that it is possible. Before, you couldn't, so now it is possible, and there's massive public support so that you do that. But note here the most important thing, this lack of excuses not to do it. You have the responsibility and the possible blame as United States, as China, if you don't do it. The opposition in your country can literally frame that you're killing people in Africa as a consequence of your veto in that organization. They can literally tell you that you're a person that is killing people over there. Lastly, they also have good incentives for these countries in the West because this, having water, will promote two things that are very important for the West, which is A, stability, which would avoid problems in which at the end of the day, the Western countries would need to go there, and B, most important, because if Africa goes and elaborates in the economy, if the water problem is solved, most likely it is better allies in order to cooperate. So they lack the incentives they all told you to have to do bad things. They already can do bad things but rather have good incentives. At the end of the day, the countries in the West already have a lot of power to do bad things. With water, as different with coal, oil, and gas, they have satisfied the need. Now, with this mechanism, we put into the hands of the world the possibility to solve the distribution and not lack of existing problem. That is how we want to debate. Thanks.
CO · OppositionI know we all live in debate land a bit, but in the real world, countries literally will go to war over this. The vast majority of developing countries are dependent on things like like developing countries are dependent on things like agriculture, which makes water incredibly politically sensitive. No, this is the difference between people starving or not starving. I think the context is things like India and Pakistan almost going to war in 1961 because of water supply. It's things like in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan having vast tensions with the rest of the country because of their position upstream, which means they control the water supply. The reason that this hasn't happened and they haven't gone to war is these countries are able to develop solutions which are A, voluntary, which is the comparative, this is about cooperation versus coercion, and B, regionally specific, which is when you get much better policies which are tailored to what the specific countries want, as opposed to what the big, even if they're well-intentioned, what the big countries like the US think you should want and think what is best for you. I think you get bad outcomes when you politicize the water supply because countries necessarily see this as a violation of sovereignty, A. B, they lack the certainty because there's a lot of political instability around what this institution will do, which is not true when you have regional solutions which you have much more autonomy of, and C, because you can be used as a bargaining power. Otto said this, I want to engage specifically with the responses which both GovTeams went, which is, well, developing countries have voting power and the majority of voting power is available for good policies. A few reasons, this collective action problem still exists, right? A, because like CG said, the problem isn't just scarcity, the problem is management. This means that different countries in different regions need different policies to manage their water supply effectively. It's things like conservation policies, it's things like capital industrial and agricultural uses, it's things like the infrastructure you have about where you direct the water supply within your country. So developing countries aren't all united in the kind of policies they want and the kind of things they need implemented to make water supplies effective. But B, even if it is about scarcity and distribution, which are two sides of the same coin, this still doesn't happen, right? Because groups of developing countries aren't all united and it's a collective action problem because they're always going to want water to go to their countries and they're probably willing to screw over the other countries which don't get that. So it's not like developing countries operate as this like unitary body which they all support things which are good for that group of countries because obviously they have specific regional incentives to boost their access to water, which means that you still don't get the like outvoting power they want because you will be factionalized and then easy to be bought over by the big powers. Okay, I think realistically the biggest problem with OO is that they never engage in the comparative, which is a fair criticism, which is they say this will be bad but they never say what will happen, why this is better and hence be able to weigh at least two things. That's what we're going to do because I think the comparative is people buying in and supporting programs which are voluntary. In the real world this looks like things like the voluntary mediation, the World Bank taking a voluntary mediation role in the Indus water treaty between India and Pakistan. It's like the UN environmental program and like having projects to get freshwater out of the ground in Sudan. These are projects that you get much more buy into for a couple of reasons. First of all, I think the reason there's a positive trajectory is largely because of reasons CG gave about how there's an organic sense of urgency. This is analogous to the climate change, right? Like in 2020 there's much more cuts being put on emissions than have ever happened before. In the case of water, India and China have signed a clean water treaty which does a lot of things. The reason they're doing this is that they're doing this authentically in a way that they consent to, which is the realistic op, which is like a Paris-style agreement, like voluntary agreements between different countries but they're regional. Of course they're not perfect, of course these problems are hard to solve but they're comparatively better for a few reasons. First of all because they are voluntary versus involuntary. I think the problem is when you when you consent to giving lots of power to this kind of organization and put lots of buy-in, it's the fear of whatever they can do to in the future because it's institutionalized, which is why you don't get buy-in in that sense. On the comparative, when you voluntarily agree to specific agreements, you know the specific terms of what you're consenting to in this way, which means you're much more likely to get buy-in to specific agreements, and also you're going to have much more control, which is the second point, which is it's about regional solutions versus international coercion, because realistically Pakistan and India should be able to decide, and they can use other institutions immediately as they have done, should decide what the best policies are for their water supply because they know what's best for them. I'm going to take OG at their best because, sorry, because OO talk about how there's like political bias in terms of hegemony. I think even in a policy sense, there's massive bias because when you have one institution deciding things, you necessarily get one size fits all policies. Why? I mean, we see this in like the IMF and the World Bank, but why is this? It's because when you have Western experts, the way in which you create policies that are better is by aggregating data, by using modeling, by using simulations, by using like common trends between countries, because when you centralize decision making in one body, that's a specific way in which it's likely to happen, which is less plausible because they're less detached from on the ground. So even like, it doesn't affect a few countries, the fact that they are massively outvoted by everyone else means they have less autonomy to put forward the solutions that they think are good, and the whole world gets to decide which policies are better for them, which is less effective. I think that's the first one, which is one size fits all policies, when you standardize and make objective, like objective metrics, as OG said, but objective solutions, it becomes much harder. But the second reason is because you get less investment from the experts, even if they're well intentioned, right, because they're more detached from the problems which happen, which means you're much more likely to take things like policy experiments, because for the experts and the people who are working at the top of this body to work out what the best policies are, the cost of them, of like it going badly is relatively low, because they're very detached from it, the visibility problem means that they don't get a lot of into it, but the payoff of them like coming up with an innovation which saves a lot of people is massive. The problem is, this isn't a game, this is literally people dying because they don't have access to water, which means regional countries should be able to have autonomy, not because of sovereignty, the principle like OO said, but because they literally know what to decide best, and they can make trade-offs best about what's best for their people in the immediate term, which they have to do much more significantly. I think this is why regional solutions are significantly better in terms of escaping this problem of like objective standards, which our international institutions always fall into, but I'm, and this, this, that really engages the CG, right, because it's like why the trajectory is better, and why you get significantly more buy-in and better outcomes. Before I move on to my next argument, I'll take OG, you have a POI.
> POI: Experts of the UN are just as smart as you and aware that regional solutions are better. If India and Pakistan agree on something, there is no incentive for anyone else to get involved. This is relevant when there are strong countries that can bully each other, and the water isn't getting dealt around.
Okay, so this, this dispense how negotiations happen, right, because it's not just Pakistan and India, they can come to mutually benefits agreements, but when then Pakistan rallies a lot of other people around its countries to support its specific policy, that means that it's much more likely to not come to the best decision which you get if you're on an equal term with negotiating. That's why concentrating power in the regional actors who necessarily do it is a good way. I also think when this has become centralized, a lot of the way institutions work is that people who come at the top gain so much credibility and so much like evidence-backed policy making that everyone kind of glorifies this veteran-centric way of thinking, which is why the IMF and the World Bank are largely controlled by the policy which the UN supports, and those mechanisms trickle down, which means when they put a solution on the table, lots of countries are likely to believe it because of that credibility bias, even if it's not, even if it's, it's not what's best or what those countries would trade up. But I want to engage with what CG said about domestic policy, because actually like management currently is with like national governments, right, but the realistic characterization is that you need local institutions, local authorities, able to implement changes. Most problems with the water supply like aren't access, aren't to do with scarcity, but it's to do with management, which federal and national institutions can't do because it's specific at local levels. This means like adapting local policies, so like when Cape Town has water usage policies but the rest of Africa doesn't. Also, yeah, and then you need local authorities to be able to implement different strategies in different areas because the problems they face are different based on the weather, based on the climate, based on the area. The thing is now you get mass complacency in these domestic institutions who are meant to implement this because you've literally moved responsibility, but also because it's much more politically feasible to always blame the organization which is demonized for being Western, which is demonized for being hegemonic, the new taking responsibility for implementing policies in effective way. That's the political trade-off you're likely to make, which is deflecting accountability towards the bigger institution, which imposes something on you, which you don't consent to, it isn't in your best interest. I'm very proud to oppose.
CG · GovernmentOne clash in this debate, which is, is this organization going to work well under the rule of the West? Or it is not. I think that the West is a good actor and they really grow. They will solve the problem. Therefore, most of the impact of the day there is of this characterization. But first, some exchange. First into CEO extension about it's better to have a voluntary solution. I have three rebuttals here, which I think are pretty good. First of all, is that I think that this is not working right now. They already can do voluntary things and they are not doing it in vast majority of cases. Why? First of all, because they have economic interest. I want all the water for me, therefore I don't care the other one. And there's no incentive actually to give it to him in most cases. Secondly, because many times the border countries hate each other because they have a history of wars and they don't want to cooperate in this stuff because they hate the other. Thirdly, because it's highly unpopular to give your resources to another country without any excuse if you are a woman of these countries and therefore they're not going to do it. Second rebuttal is that even if it works because it's voluntary, I think that these motions assume that most of the country voluntarily accept this. This organization has been formed somehow. So I think that most of the country should adhere to this. I think that it's almost violating the motion saying that no country wants to cooperate with this, but the organization was built up. And finally, the rebuttal is that even if they are angry at the first because they are forced out, if they are true and they have self-matching incentives in order to cooperate with each other, maybe they are angry at first, but after that, even if they are forced, they will cooperate anyway because they say they have very good incentives to do so, so they will also cooperate after being forced. Second thing they say is that the organization is not going to work well because there is West bias. I do agree with the bias. What I say is that good because we have good incentive in order to solve this problem. That's what I'm turning extension was about. That's what I will take in the class of this debate. Finally, they think that locals will cooperate and this is very important for them because locals are the ones which know better the problem and the resources. Memory battles, first locals know the place, but they have no technology. We will have better technology, more experts, et cetera. But secondly, as I say, I think locals will cooperate a lot because they have disincentives and also because in the long term, when this organization has the control of the water, you want to have good terms with them because they control the water, so maybe in the short term, you have bad relationship because you have to impose, but in the middle term, you are going to have good relation. Finally, exchange rebuttal to OO principle about sovereignty. We think that sovereignty is not very important and actually we jump this principle continuously when we are talking about saving people. For example, if you let your people die, if international community has the principle on a responsibility to protect and you can intervene and violate the sovereignty because people is dying or if you invade another country and you're killing people, you let the United Nations to go and violate sovereignty because everybody knows that is more important to save lives. Now, into the most important point of this debate, we think that West is a very good actor. Everyone in this debate say that they are going to take the decisions which are agree with that. We say that they are going to take good decision and therefore solve this problem and therefore put this problem at an end and save a lot of lives. So all of them agree that West is going to rule and what we say is that they have no interest in doing what they say, which is being very bad actors and take bad decisions. First of all, because it's very unpopular to turn the water off the people. I think that this is impossible to justify in the United States. You are voting to say that people can die because they have nothing to drink. I think that it's going to be difficult to justify. Even for Trump voters, that's something that has no sense at all. Secondly, because they think they have already absolute power over this region. They are talking about Eritrea, about Afghanistan, about most of the countries we are talking about are in Africa. This country has nothing to do against United States already. They don't need this tool at all. But thirdly, most important, obviously, we are not talking about a stupid mechanism. As in all the sanctions that United Nations does, the Security Council has to vote it. You cannot do sanctions. In water, it would be the same. If you have to impose water sanctions, probably you will have to go through a Security Council. Most of the superpowers of the Political Council have check and balances over the other. China will better if you want to starve and make people lie of not having water in Iran, for example. I think that they have no incentives to doing this. What we think they have, and this is the key of Antonio's extension, is a lot of mechanisms why West is a very good actor in order to talk about water and in order to solve this problem. First mechanism, completely unrebutted, and I think this is very important, is the huge amount of political pressure that the presidents of the West will face inside. They will have no excuse. The excuse that the West has now is, oh, people is dying, but I can do nothing. It's their country. Now you have the water. Every single person which died because there is no water is guilty of this international organization. Who is going to explain to the population that there's 2 million or 3 million people dying because lack of water when you have the control of that organization? How are you going to explain to the voters that you are saying no to the water, to these people that you are betting and putting all your power in this international organization not to do so? I think it's impossible and the opposition will use this against you. If you are such a bad person, the opposition will put all your electorate against you because it's very unpopular, even for the worst person in the West to let people in Africa die because they don't have water. Secondly, Antonio also said another mechanism which is unrebutted, which is this is good for the West. They want stabilization in this zone in order to maintain the oil prices down, in order to develop these countries, in order to have good partners in order to trade. I don't see why they want to maintain them in bad economic situations. Thirdly, because it's going to be very unpopular to not use the resources. How are you going to justify in the United Nations that you are using the money for developing and cooperation to build roads when people is dying and you have the control of water? Why are you not using that money in order to build infrastructures and share the water? There is no single reason. I think that for all these reasons, we have very good chances that the West is a good actor and shares the water correctly. I have to give the point to OO.
> POI: CG are correct that we sometimes temporarily violate sovereignty to deal with acute humanitarian crises, but we do not permanently take away countries' control of their own things because by that logic we would internationalize the health care laws.
I think that the principle is the same. I violate once time because I want to save lives. If I have to violate it continuously in order to continuously save lives, the principle is the same. If after 10 years I have to continue violating sovereignty in order to save lives, the principle which justifies this in the first time is still there. Finally, West have all the water that they want and they don't need this at all. I think that the only thing that you heard in opposition are biases against the West. They don't systematically analyze the incentives of the West in this specific case, that they are just to help these people because it's popular in your electorate. It's the most easy thing in order to be popular in your countries, to save the lives of people by giving them something to drink. I think that there is no rebuttal to this and it's the most important thing. See how all the mechanisms in opposition depend on the West being bad and taking bad decisions. We think that in the long term, it will be impossible to justify not saving people's lives. In 20-30 years, they will be forced to build up infrastructures and share this water. With this, we save all the lives that opening government wanted to save and we win the debate solving this clash. Thank you very much.
CO · OppositionOpening opposition finds itself in the very difficult position of conceding to a problem, but not identifying a solution. Kira says that A, there's an organic sense of urgency which exists the closer that humanity gets to the precipice. I really wish that these climate change regulations had come in 1990. I really do. They came in 2020. They are late, but they are not too late. We showed you that when humanity comes closer and closer to the precipice, the unique political, domestic, and regional international capital does exist to change things. Secondly, all of opening government and closing government's mechanisms for Western pressure, doing this the right way, are reasons why countries are currently moving towards doing this the right way, which means that their policy doesn't seem to have a raison d'etre in this debate. But let's deal with the two mechanisms that they had against us. One, it's not happening yet. Okay, just because you don't know where it's happening doesn't mean that it's not happening. Just because it snows where you live doesn't mean the world isn't getting hotter. One, the clean water treaty between India and China. Two, the water conservation treaty between every single state in the African Union. Three, Russia literally mediating water treaties between all five Central Asian states to the Eurasian Economic Union. The fact that you don't know these exist doesn't mean that they don't exist. The second thing that they said to us was, well, they will consent to this organization because fiat. No, no fiat. I'm going to counter assert that you don't have fiat. But secondly, structurally speaking, even if you initially buy into the organization, you still have reasons to go to war. Like literally all of the reasons Akira gave you are the reasons why even if you're forced into the organization, you won't be forced to stay. And those reasons still apply. That was a very limited response. The final thing I'll say in terms of the rebuttal to us, which I think is really important, is that our argument wasn't about the politics of the West. It was about the policy of the West. That went completely unresponded to. We didn't argue like, oh, that, you know, U.S. devil, hegemonic actor, etc., etc. We said U.S., World Bank, one size fits all policy. You have a Western establishment that sets up policies for across the world. And because experts are detached from the realities of the global poor, they will often set up policies for the sake of innovation and experimentation. What we say is this is not a fucking game because people die. What was our alternative then? We said that two things need to happen. And we argue our case around the Paris Agreement style model. One, there should be voluntary obligations as opposed to involuntary obligations. The reason for that is that you maximize buy-in. And here's where opening opposition sovereignty argument comes in. They said sovereignty is a right. I don't think so. Sovereignty is an arbitrary organizing principle. We could have been sovereign along any other lines. The reason that sovereignty is important is that because people care about sovereignty, it's instrumentally valuable. Hence, securing buy-in is what is most important. It's no surprise, hence, that 170 countries have signed up to the Paris Agreement because they know they can always pull out. In fact, somewhat counterintuitively, being able to always pull out is the reason you stay in because you know that you're not tethered to a coercive organization, which is very important to understand. But secondly, we said that regional cooperation is infinitely more important than international cooperation. Think of all of the examples I gave you at the top of my speech. This makes Ira's argument about the one-size-fits-all policy exponentially more powerful because the point at which you have the United States and specifically think tanks in Washington, D.C., deciding how India and Pakistan mediate in this river, it's not going to work out. These people do not have a lay of the land, not the requisite education, or the political realities of what these countries are like, and hence will be incapable, not just disincentivized, like opening opposition said, in terms of making the right treaties. Hence, all of the reasons that government benches have given are reasons why we're moving towards cooperation, and the burden of proof on government bench was to show to us why coercion and international global coercion was necessary in this debate. Now, I'm going to specifically examine opening government's claims. Before I do that, please, opening government.
> POI: We understand the agreements are imperfect. We explain why this mechanism uniquely creates perception issues for world powers to solve the biggest scarcity issues that aren't being voluntarily solved today. This is the biggest impact in the debate.
No, I completely agree. It's not perfect. In fact, I have several problems with the Paris Agreement. I'm saying it's the best thing that we have because the alternative is literally going to war. The alternative is great powers controlling all water resources. The alternative is mass domestic complacency because you can blame all international demonic powers for whatever is happening in your country. I agree it's not perfect. I'm arguing it's better. Two claims on opening government. One, water is a principal right. Number one, this is hung completely on practical outcomes insofar as it can only work if they guarantee access. Number two, if their flip is representation, it's hung on legitimate representation. And here is where the great powers argument comes in, because the great powers argument sort of presupposes that Russia is a perfect proxy of all of its allies, or the US is a perfect proxy for all of its allies. That's our entire problem. And the poorest countries which need water the most are the countries which will have the least say within these within these sort of organizations within these discussions. But thirdly, and more importantly, like just you clash this with sovereign self-defense on opening opposition. But I think the way that you win the sovereign self-defense argument is that such a dangerous international precedent for taking more and more power internationally from the poorest countries. Hence water is a principal right doesn't stand. Second argument, different interests balance each other out because great powers can clash with each other. First response. This is literally the description of the collective action problem. There's a reason why different powers clash with each other and don't figure something out. There's a policy gridlock. That was our entire intuition. Two, the biggest problem is the US does have water. Russia does have water. China does have water. They have an incentive to fuck around with other countries. And when the rich wage war, it's the poor that die. But number four, I just want to point out that the sort of interest that you're mediating in terms of great power interest would be fundamentally different from the interest of the poor. Let's talk about closing government. The first thing I just want to say is that all of the argument about, you know, now that the best has co-opted this organization, the best will be responsible is bullshit because the Western UN has overseen 52 civil wars and 16 genocides. I don't think this has led them to become any more responsible in the past than they have in the future. Like, I just think this is a bullshit argument. Just because you're tethered to a certain organization doesn't mean that you become exponentially better at running it. But the second thing I just want to point out is that even if there are arguments for people are dying externally, domestically speaking, leaders in Sudan, local officials in Mogadishu can now say, for instance, it's not us who are not giving you water. It's the West. It's not us who are not providing you the proper water management policies. It's these Western organizations. So if anything, we flip the political capital argument on their end. Insofar as we prove that the reasons that they give for why the West will be a responsible actor are the reasons that can be flipped by domestic politicians to propagandize this issue and politicize this issue and make sure that no buy-in is secured. What is this debate about then? Opening opposition refused to give us a positive pathway. We showed you that this positive pathway can only occur to an organic sense of urgency, unfortunately, because of human nature and secondly, because of government's own mechanisms. But secondly, we showed you that voluntary regional cooperation is the best pathway forward. The alternative is global poor not having access to the water as the rich capitalize on this international organization and systematic war and discontent. I'm very proud to oppose.